It's not (yet) a mitzvah to be happy

Is there a halachic process for hashkafa?

You will no doubt be familiar with the claim that there is a mitzvah to be happy, or even a mitzvah to always be happy. It is particularly associated with Breslev, but Breslev, especially here in the Holy Land, has penetrated so far and wide that its teachings have become increasingly coterminous with orthodox Judaism. This claim is usually based on the following passage from the קללות שבמשנה תורה:

וּבָאוּ עָלֶיךָ כָּל־הַקְּלָלוֹת הָאֵלֶּה וּרְדָפוּךָ וְהִשִּׂיגוּךָ עַד הִשָּׁמְדָךְ כִּי־לֹא שָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ לִשְׁמֹר מִצְוֺתָיו וְחֻקֹּתָיו אֲשֶׁר צִוָּךְ׃ וְהָיוּ בְךָ לְאוֹת וּלְמוֹפֵת וּבְזַרְעֲךָ עַד־עוֹלָם׃ תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עָבַדְתָּ אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב מֵרֹב כֹּל׃

The bolded verse is understood to mean ‘Because you did not serve HASHEM, your God, amid gladness and goodness of heart when everything was abundant.’¹ Therefore, the verse is saying that because of failure to serve God in happiness all the aforementioned curses will come upon Israel.

The problem with this translation is simply that the word תחת does not mean ‘because’. The primary meaning of the word is to be spatially below something, as in לְכָל־חֵפֶץ תַּחַת הַשָּׁמָיִם, כִּי־תִרְאֶה חֲמוֹר שֹׂנַאֲךָ רֹבֵץ תַּחַת מַשָּׂאוֹ, or וַיְשַׁבֵּר אֹתָם תַּחַת הָהָר. Its secondary meaning (also used for ‘under’ in English) is to be subject to something, e.g. מִתַּחַת סִבְלוֹת מִצְרָיִם. Finally, it can mean ‘in place of’ something as in וַיַּעֲלֵהוּ לְעֹלָה תַּחַת בְּנוֹ, וַיִּסְגֹּר בָּשָׂר תַּחְתֶּנָּה, or וַיַּמְלִיכֶ֖הָ תַּ֥חַת וַשְׁתִּֽי. There are two places in late biblical Hebrew, both in Divrei haYamim (II 21:12 and II 34:25), where this meaning is further extended into something equivalent to ‘because’

In order to determine whether this is the case for our chosen verse, we can look at another instance of the word תחת in the same passage.

וְנִשְׁאַרְתֶּם בִּמְתֵי מְעָט תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר הֱיִיתֶם כְּכוֹכְבֵי הַשָּׁמַיִם לָרֹב כִּי־לֹא שָׁמַעְתָּ בְּקוֹל יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ׃

Plainly, this does not mean ‘you will be left few in number because you were like the stars of the heavens for multitude’, rather it means ‘you will be left few in number in place of how you were like the stars of the heavens for multitude’. This construction is somewhat difficult to render in English while preserving the word order. ‘In place of’ doesn’t work well, and the most natural translation of תחת here would be ‘instead of’, but this would have to be at the beginning of the verse. A free paraphrase might run ‘instead of being numerous like the stars, you will be left few in number’.

Regardless, it is abundantly clear that, in the precise register and dialect of Hebrew being used in this passage, the meaning of תחת is ‘in place of’ and not ‘because’. Translating the word accurately, gives us ‘In place of how you did not serve God in happiness and abundance and good heart, from much abundance’ and the referent is not to the previous verses, but those following it:

תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר לֹא־עָבַדְתָּ אֶת־יְהוָה אֱלֹהֶיךָ בְּשִׂמְחָה וּבְטוּב לֵבָב מֵרֹב כֹּל׃ וְעָבַדְתָּ אֶת־אֹיְבֶיךָ אֲשֶׁר יְשַׁלְּחֶנּוּ יְהוָה בָּךְ בְּרָעָב וּבְצָמָא וּבְעֵירֹם וּבְחֹסֶר כֹּל וְנָתַן עֹל בַּרְזֶל עַל־צַוָּארֶךָ עַד הִשְׁמִידוֹ אֹתָךְ׃ יִשָּׂא יְהוָה עָלֶיךָ גּוֹי מֵרָחוֹק מִקְצֵה הָאָרֶץ כַּאֲשֶׁר יִדְאֶה הַנָּשֶׁר גּוֹי אֲשֶׁר לֹא־תִשְׁמַע לְשֹׁנוֹ׃

The thrust is that, in place of not serving God when you were wealthy and happy, you will serve your enemies in hunger, thirst and the lack of everything. The phraseבשמחה ובטוב לב מרב כל clearly parallels ברעב ובצמא ובעירום ובחסר כל, and ‘happiness’ describes not a neglected condition of serving God, but rather the conditions that pertained when you did not serve God. As the rest of the passage makes clear, the issue is not that Israel served God without sufficient happiness, but that they were not serving God at all.

This is obvious. In order to arrive at the reading that has become prevalent in orthodox circles, you have to insist on a rare meaning of תחת found only in late biblical Hebrew, not be able to infer its meaning from its use in the same passage, and lack basic reading comprehension ability. More than that, you also need to be oblivious to basic legal hermeneutics - Jewish or otherwise - because, if the verse was telling you that Israel will be punished for serving God without sufficient happiness, there would need to be some other verse stating this obligation in the first place, but there is none. עונש שמענו, אזהרה מניין. And, on top of that, you would also need to be quite mad, because it is entirely implausible that all the terrible punishments described in the passage should be visited on Israel simply because, though they complied with the requirements of the covenant, they didn’t do so happily.

But what do Hazal say?

You may respond, though, that p’shat in the pasuk isn’t the main thing. Judaism is based on authoritative interpretations from Hazal, which may or may not match up with p’shat in any given case. This is not untrue, but you do need to actually check what Hazal said first. To the best of my knowledge, there is only one drasha on this verse, which appears in B Arachin 11a:

רב מתנה אמר מהכא (דברים כח, מז) תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב איזו היא עבודה שבשמחה ובטוב לבב הוי אומר זה שירה

The gemara there is searching for a proof that the song sung by Levites accompanying each korban is mandated by the Torah law. This is the second of many proof texts that are suggested, and it is clearly based on a reading somewhat similar to the prevalent one today. The word בשמחה is not read, as it means in context, as referring to a background state in which Israel may or may not serve God, but as an element of the service itself. That is where the similarity ends, though. Whereas the popular understanding is that joy is a condition of service of God in general, the drasha is premised on that not being the case, instead assuming that joy is the identifying feature of a specific type of service, namely song in the temple. Whether or not the drasha itself is authoritative,² it provides no support for, and indeed precludes, the understanding of the verse which derives from it a general obligation to be happy when performing all mitzvot.

What about the mefarshim?

Without any basis in the verse itself, or what is generally referred to as the Oral Torah, we must now turn to medieval commentators to see if there is precedent for this approach. From Ramban, Sforno, Rashbam, and Hizkuni we hear nothing, the verse being sufficiently clear for someone versed in biblical Hebrew to need no comment. Rashi and Ibn Ezra both explain the phrase מרב כל in a way that clearly presupposes the analysis above, and Bechor Shor states it explicitly. Rambam also affirms that this is the מפורש meaning of the verse here.

Nevertheless, against the above list, we do see two Rishonim who reads the pasuk according to the Breslev interpretation in its more moderate form. First, R. Bahye Ben Asher (known as Rabbeinu Behaye in frum circles) is principally notable for being the first exegete to quote from the Zohar, only a few decades after its publication by the compulsive forger, Moshe de Leon. On our pasuk, he writes as follows:

יאשימנו הכתוב בעבדו השי"ת ולא היתה העבודה בשמחה, לפי שחייב האדם על השמחה בהתעסקו במצות, והשמחה במעשה המצוה מצוה בפני עצמו, מלבד השכר שיש לו על המצוה יש לו שכר על השמחה, ועל כן יעניש בכאן למי שעובד עבודת המצוה כשלא עשאה בשמחה, ולכך צריך שיעשה אדם המצות בשמחה ובכוונה שלמה, וכן אמרו במדרש רות אלו היה יודע ראובן שהקב"ה מכתיב עליו וישמע ראובן ויצלהו מידם, בכתפו היה מוליכו לאביו, ואלו היה יודע אהרן שהקב"ה מכתיב עליו וראך ושמח בלבו, בתופים ובמחולות היה יוצא לקראתו, ואלו היה יודע בועז שהקב"ה מכתיב עליו ותאכל ותשבע ותותר, עגלים פטומים היה מאכילה.

Unlike the expanded Breslev concept, R. Bahye Ben Asher (≈1255-1340) restricts the obligation of happiness to fulfilment of mitzvot, but the fact is that his only source doesn’t say that. Ruth Rabah is a post-talmudic - though perhaps not very post-talmudic - source of moderate aggadic authority, but it clearly states that the requirement is to fulfil mitzvot בלבב שלם and not in happiness, unless the circumstances specifically require it.³

The second Rishon is also Aragonese, but this time a philosopher rather than a mystic. R. Yosef Albo (≈1380-1444), was a student of R. Hasdai Crescas, probably the most open-minded and forward thinking representatives of the medieval rationalist tradition. He wrote Sefer haIkkarim, an under-studied book, with a number of unresolved interpretive cruxes, that might be understood as the last gasp of a tradition whose time was up, or as the beginning of a path regettabl not taken, depending on your point of view. In any case, R. Albo writes:

הדבר הנותן שלמות אל המצוה כדי שיושג על ידה התכלית המכוון בה הוא השמחה, כי השמחה נותנת גמר ושלמות אל הדבר הנפעל, עד שהפעל האחד בעצמו כשיעשה בשמחה ובטוב לב יקרא מעלה, וכאשר יעשה בעצבון יקרא פחיתות, וזה דבר נתבאר במאמר השני מספר המדות לאריסטו, כי הנדיב כשיעשה פעל הנדיבות והוא שמח בפעל ההוא יקרא מעלה, ואם יפעלהו בעצבון יקרא פחיתות. וכן נמצא הכתוב מיעד הגמול על עשית הצדקה בשמחה, אמר נתון תתן לו ולא ירע לבבך בתתך לו כי בגלל הדבר הזה יברכך ה׳ אלהיך, תלה הברכה בולא ירע לבבך ולא בנתון תתן לו.

ויתבאר זה באור יותר שלם על זה הדרך, אין ספק כי הפעל היותר נכבד והיותר מעולה ראוי שיקובל עליו שכר מהשם על עשייתו והעונש על הפכו לפי הדרך התוריי, ואין בעולם פעל יותר נכבד ויותר מעולה שראוי שיקובל עליו שכר כפי האמת בעצמו וכפי הסכמת כל האנשים אלא עבודת השם יתברך, ונמצא הכתוב מיעד העונש הגדול על מי שאינו עובד השם יתברך בשמחה, אמר משה במשנה תורה תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה׳ אלהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב מרוב כל ועבדת את אויביך וגו׳, תלה העונש על שלא עבד השם יתברך בשמחה לא על שלא עבד במוחלט.

In light of what I wrote above, it is not clear to me how R. Albo could have come to the conclusion that this is what the verse means. He explains further:

וענין הכתוב יורה שפירושו כך, כי לא יתכן שיאמר שהעונש יגיע אליו על שלא עבדו בהיותו בשמחה, שאם כן יתחייב שלא יהיה האדם מחוייב לעבוד את השם יתברך כשלא יהיה בשמחה וברוב כל, ומזה יראה שקיום המצוה בשמחה נותן גמר ושלמות אל המצוה

But this just seems to be oblivious to both the poetic qualities and semantic thrust of the passage. It is true that we are presumably supposed to observe the Torah in conditions of penury and suffering, but this is irrelevant to the passage, which is not making statements about all possible states of affairs, but about a particular historical narrative that it is predicting will come to pass.

With all that said, as they say in Yeshiva, he taka says it. However, with no disrespect intended, R. Albo brings nothing to justify his interpretation except his fault hermeneutics, and its correspondence with the Ethics of Aristotle. There is, though, one more source that is generally considered authoritative. Though, as we have seen, Rambam cites the verse according to its contextual meaning in Hilchot Talmud Torah, in two other places he cites it in a quasi-midrashic sense, somewhat close to R. Bahye Ben Asher’s understanding. In both cases, he is making a specific point. First, in Hilchot Shevitat Yom Tov 6:20, he cites the verse against excessive revelry, laughter and drinking affirming that the requirement for joy during the regalim refers toהשמחה שיש בה עבודת יוצר הכל. Secondly, at the end of his description of the Simhat Beit haShoeivah, he writes:

השמחה שישמח אדם בעשית המצוה ובאהבת האל שצוה בהן. עבודה גדולה היא. וכל המונע עצמו משמחה זו ראוי להפרע ממנו שנאמר תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב

The referent of this comment is genuinely unclear. It follows his comment in the previous halacha מצוה להרבות בשמחה זו, namely the joy of Simhat Beit haShoeivah itself, but it is phrased as if it is a general point, and seems to be aimed against ascetics, as part of a general comment in favour of Aristotelian Golden Mean ethics.

Case closed?

As we have seen, the citation of Devarim 28:47 to support the claim either that there is an obligation to be happy generally, or while performing mitzvot, is based on a gross misreading of the pasuk, and has no basis in the canonical texts of the Oral Torah. It has two sources. (1) an interpretation of two medieval commentators (2) two homiletical comments in Rambam’s Mishneh Torah aimed at particular (opposite) forms of unethical behaviour, after he has already pointed to the real meaning of the pasuk. None of these sources points to any earlier precedent because there is none. For many, that will be enough to reject the idea, and I shall not argue with them, but, without further support, this is not a tenable position for me to take.

Part of this point of this website is finding a middle way between two positions on the relationship between halacha as a body of laws and customs that exist today, and as a system set out in the Mishnah, Talmud and other texts from Hazal. One approach we reject as unsustainable is that whatever is taught as halacha today by recognized authorities is automatically authoritative because of mesora, da’as Torah, ‘the halachic process’ or any other justification. The other is that a complete system of halacha can be derived from studying the authoritative texts, and halachic rulings given today are only authoritative if they accord with that; otherwise, they are wrong.

Instead, what we (well, really Johanan) are trying to do is offer an account of halacha that is simultaneously true to halacha as an observable system today, as well as academic study of how this halachic system came to be. One basic point is that halacha always develops - and therefore ipso facto development is a legitimate feature of halacha - but that does not mean that every development is correct and cannot be reversed. We do not have the certainty of taking a snapshot of halacha either as it is developing today or at any point in the past and asserting it to be absolutely authoritative. The complexity of halacha, beyond a certain point, is irreducible, and that is in large part (though not solely) because it contains an irreducible element of human judgement. There just isn’t an algorithm that you can use to tell you what is halachically authoritative. We can offer no substitute for intensive study of the development of halacha as it has occurred for the period (roughly 2,200 years) where we have some documentation, combined with responsible norms of argument and debate.

Now, all that is true for halacha, but how much more so for hashkafa, where even the pretence of a system of formal codification does not exist. Those who insist most strenuously on the absolute halachic authority of the Talmud Bavli simultaneously claim that its non-halachic material must either be disregarded or explained away, for obvious reasons. It would certainly be desirable, from my point of view at least, to be able categorically reject the Breslev interpretation of תחת אשר לא עבדת mandating perpetual happiness as outside of legitimate Judaism, but there simply isn’t a coherent intellectual framework to do so. What I can do is propose the following arguments:

1. The proposed explanation of the verse is, from any coherent or intelligible concept of p’shat, plainly wrong.

2. There is no basis for this explanation of the verse in any text from Hazal, and the one drasha we do find precludes it.

3. Empirically, the Breslev concept of Judaism as a religion of constant happiness is very good at winning recruits from diverse walks of life, but it is very poor as a basis for Jewish life. We can cite here the horrors of Shuvu Banim, the Ambash family, the ‘tzaddik’ of Yavniel, terrorist settlers, and junkies pulling up in a van and breakdancing to trance ‘music’ while you are trying to have a cup of coffee.

I think these are good arguments, but they all fall within the realm of ‘moral certainty’. There is no absolute proof that the concept of מצוה גדולה להיות בשמחה תמיד is not part of normative Judaism. This is, fundamentally, because there is no qualitative difference between modern authorities and classic ones or, to put it another way, the canon was never sealed. If someone wants to introduce a new concept into Judaism, it should be difficult - indeed, it should be a great deal more difficult than in practice it has been - but there is nothing that rules it out per se. Or, to put a third way, whether this concept becomes authoritative in Judaism depends on what Jews (not just any Jews, but those whose opinions matter) decide. Jewish thought is derivative of Jewish law (this is a descriptive not normative statement), and so fundamentally comes down to precedent.

In our case, we can find precedent for the obligation to be happy when performing mitzvot as far back as R. Bahye Ben Asher, and perhaps even in the Rambam. The extended version of this concept requiring perpetual happiness is about 200 years old and has spread like wildfire in the last 50 years. We do not have to go back too far before the chain of precedent for מצוה גדולה להיות בשמחה תמיד fizzles out entirely, but we do not necessarily have to go too far forward before there is enough precedence to establish normativity. Perhaps we are already there. We may justly hope that God will have sufficient mercy to guide us to the right place eventually, but both biblical and post-biblical precedent give us no reason to believe this will happen in an expeditious fashion. And, if it happens, who is to say what His instrument will be? Many hundreds of thousands of Jews believe that the Torah says something which it plainly does not. It can’t hurt to point it out.

1. Translation is from the OU.

2. This is not clear. The gemara presents two refutations and rejects both of them, but if the drasha is accepted, it’s not clear why the gemara then presents numerous others. For our purposes, though, it perhaps makes no odds because both refutations presuppose that there is a particular mitzvah that is characterized by שמחה וטוב לבב, be it learning Torah or bikkurim.

3. Note that in the cited pasuk, Aharon haCohen is described as rejoicing, but his way of greeting Moshe Rabbeinu is considered inadequate because joy is not a relevant requirement.